Re: Major security hole in Hyperledger Fabric - Private Data is not private #fabric #fabric-questions #ssl #fabric-dstorage #fabric-chaincode
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I think I understand your concern. Let me try to include some comments based on the ongoing discussion:
Semantics of dataYour example: “my national ID is "1234567", but I am a bad guy and want others to believe that my national ID number is "7654321". so I put the false hash(salt, "7654321") on chain, and then send pre-images (salt, "7654321") to whoever I want to convince. Since nobody can verify the hash(salt, "7654321") when the hash was put on chain without prior knowledge of the data, an adversary can use the claims about private data functionality to trick people to believe forged data.”
Please take into account that the fact of storing something in Blockchain and being able to demonstrate it was stored would not certify the semantics of your data, at least, no more than the certification the business logic of the smart-contract would guarantee. So, if a client application is sending just a digest, there wouldn’t be a way for the smart-contract alone to execute a meaningful validation.
In the example above, if peers do not have a way to validate your national ID, peers may never claim the provided or stored data is valid. This scenario is not limited to HF or Blockchain but to any procedure.
As you pointed out and already explained along the thread, by sending not only the digest but also a SALT as transient data, only selected peers will receive your SALT so preventing dictionary attacks.
Revealing dataAs you mentioned, just one corrupted or compromised peer is enough to reveal its data. That is a very general problem and in such case, you would need to prevent a single peer from gathering entire pieces of your data or use homomorphic encryption.
On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 1:42 AM Jay Guo <guojiannan1101@...> wrote: