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Hyperledger - Aft... - That opens the door to collusion of a...

Deventer, M.O. (Oskar) van <oskar.vandeventer@...>
 

Dear Andreas Freund,

 

Thank you for your comment below, which I have received via Google Docs. As noted in my response to you in the Google Doc, the place to discuss fundamental requirements issues is at the Hyperledger RequirementsWG mailing list (this list).

 

I believe that your comment is missing the essence of my document.

 

  • That opens the door to collusion of all sorts

A qualified majority of validators can always collude (cf. Ethereum+DAO). An essence of blockchain is that they cannot collude covertly.

 

  • running a Blockchain platform does not mean you should know who controls smart contracts.

My document is not about identity not does it make assumptions about the implementation. It is a set of requirements for a law-abiding consortium blockchain that is offering an enterprise-grade blockchain service that wants to be able to comply to a court order of their applicable jurisdiction. I believe that the formulated requirements are fair, even if your hypothetical current implementation cannot comply to them.

 

  • validators nodes provided by a consortium should be crytpographically sealed upon deployment without ability to access the node from the outside.

The Hyperledger RequirementsWG is about requirements, not about implementations that can or cannot comply to the requirement.

 

  • What can be done is to have a function in a smart contract that allows reassignment based on m-of-n multisig of registered identities

One cannot “after-the-fact” retrofit an existing and validated smart contract with m-of-n multisig, nor does my proposed set of requirements require this. Your solution can be used to addresses the “lost keys” problem, which is not what my document is about.

 

Please let me know if I am missing something.

 

Best regards,

 

Oskar

 

 

From: Andreas Freund (Google Docs) [mailto:d+MTA5ODc1OTgwNjAwMDc1MTUwNjY3-MTAzNTMzNjc5Njk5NDU1ODU5NTU0@...]
Sent: Tuesday, 18 July, 2017 23:39
To: Deventer, M.O. (Oskar) van <oskar.vandeventer@...>
Subject: Hyperledger - Aft... - That opens the door to collusion of a...

 

Andreas Freund added a comment to Hyperledger - After-the-fact mandate changes

Andreas Freund

Andreas Freund

A blockchain consortium shall be able to sign over the authorization over a smart contract from one user (“anchor”) to another user (“guardian”).

That opens the door to collusion of all sorts ... running a Blockchain platform does not mean you should know who controls smart contracts. In fact, validators nodes provided by a consortium should be crytpographically sealed upon deployment without ability to access the node from the outside. What can be done is to have a function in a smart contract that allows reassignment based on m-of-n multisig of registered identities

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